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Abstract 
In this chapter we consider some of the ethical challenges inherent in the regulation of 
discretionary police power. Discretion is central to police policy and practice, but it also 
provides a level of freedom that opens up the space for injustice and inequity, and this is seen 
most vividly in recent debates about unfairness and racial profiling in the distribution and 
experience police stops in the US and UK. How to regulate discretionary power is a challenging 
question, and this is especially so in the context of practices like stop-and-search/stop-and-frisk. 
The ability to stop people in the street and question them is central to policing as it is 
understood in many liberal democracies, but under conditions of unfairness and questionable 
efficacy – when the application of this particular police power appears unethical as well as 
ineffective – one can reasonably ask whether the power should be dropped or curtailed, and if 
curtailed, how this would work in practice. 
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Dubber (2005) describes the police power as unlimited, and while he was referring to a concept 
of police much broader than the uniformed public police service that is our focus here, it is 
certainly true that the police remit is both broad in terms of its potential objects (threats to the 
stability of established social order) and wide in the set of means available to achieve its aims 
(up to and including the use of deadly force). The extent of the power vested in police, the fact 
that most officers operate in low visibility settings, and the discretion many of them wield – all 
these factors create significant problems of oversight, governance and, inevitably, ethics. That 
policing tactics and techniques are often only loosely constrained in law and/or are unavailable 
to other actors (Brodeur 2010) serves only to make these issues more pertinent and more 
pressing.  
 
Our goal in this chapter is to consider some of the ethical challenges inherent in the regulation 
of discretionary police power. Invoking the ability to address a situation either formally 
(evoking legal categories) or informally (using situated problem solving), discretion is central to 
police policy and practice, but it also provides a level of freedom that opens up the space for 
injustice and inequity, and this is seen most vividly in recent debates about unfairness and racial 
profiling in the distribution and experience police stops in the US and UK. Police are able to use 
a huge range of tactics to address the problems they encounter, yet the low visibility and high 
discretion granted to street-level officers ensures that only relatively rarely will these solutions 
be ‘second-guessed’ by supervisors or, more pertinently, external review processes. This is 
arguably a characteristic of all police, but these issues pose particular problems in liberal 
democratic states where the power of the state over citizens is, at least from an ideological 
perspective, constrained. In such contexts, police indeed remain something of an exceptional 
power – one that poses a significant threat to liberties many would consider both well-
established and inviolable.  
 
How to regulate discretionary power, to channel it in ethically desirable directions, is a 
challenging question, and this is especially so in the context of practices like stop-and-
search/stop-and-frisk. The ability to stop people in the street and question them is central to 
policing as it is understood in many liberal democracies, but under conditions of unfairness and 
questionable efficacy – when the application of this particular police power appears unethical as 
well as ineffective – one can reasonably ask whether the power should be dropped or curtailed, 
and if curtailed, how this would work in practice. Changing the legal landscape may help, 
particularly as it relates to racial profiling. One solution to the problem of inequitable policing 
outcomes may be to make the practices that produce them illegal, and then enforce such laws 
with established and/or new or novel mechanisms. But the empirical fact that police need to be 
able to deal at least provisionally with the huge range of problems with which they are 
confronted limits this possibility in important ways. Police officers are the first, and often only, 
responders to a huge variety of situations and events; they require an ability to react to and 
(re)direct these events that is – due to the significant freedom and discretion required – by 
definition difficult if not impossible to codify within a set of legal rules. What is the ‘right thing’ 
to do, in a given situation, cannot be determined in such a manner. 
 
How might these policies and practices be regulated? Whether the onus comes from a change in 
the legal landscape or from other cultural, social and political pressures, there are in our minds 
three main ways in which the ethical curtailment – or perhaps more precisely re-direction – of 
stop-and-search/stop-and-frisk practices might be achieved “on the ground.” First, the visibility 
of police activity could be increased – something that is already occurring as a result of the 
uptake of camera phones and other mobile technologies, the work of ‘citizen journalists’ and 
others, and policy movement toward officers using and wearing video cameras. Yet, while the 
importance of such developments should not be understated they are unlikely to provide a 
panacea; the camera can lie and there will always be a limit to what can and should be recorded.  
 
Second, in a related but wider sense, extrinsic modes of bureaucratic regulation can be utilized 
that motivate either individual officers or police organizations to behave in a more ethical 
fashion, by which we mean acting in line with established norms of probity and right, in ways 
that respect the rights of citizens to be as free from intrusive state power as possible, being 
honest and transparent, and so forth. By extrinsic, we mean authority structures and processes 
either within police organizations, aimed at directing officer practice (e.g. reward and 
disciplinary schemes), or outside police organizations, aimed at directing the activity of the 
organization as a whole (e.g. civilian oversight, Police and Crime Commissioners etc.).  
 
This is, by and large, the ‘traditional’ approach to corralling the power of the police and 
directing it in normatively desirable directions. It has claimed some success, with police practice 
in many developed countries changing for the better over the years as a result of regulatory 
change and related factors. While it may be impossible to come up with a definitive list of things 
police can and cannot do (see above), particular behaviours (such as aggressive interrogations) 
can be, and have been, curtailed and often prohibited. Such change has frequently been 
associated with extrinsic pressure on police organizations to change their practices or suffer a 
loss of material or symbolic capital.  
  
Yet, despite these developments, present-day police practice is plainly still far from ideal – 
witness, precisely, the on-going scandals about police stop practices in contexts as diverse as 
Scotland (Murray, 2014), Spain (Añón et al., 2013) and the United States (Tyler et al., 2014). 
Simply banning (making illegal) particular practices does not mean they do not take place, and 
as we describe below, there are two important reasons for the continued failure of regulatory 
change to rein in the power of the police and direct police activity in more desirable directions. 
Not only do external modes of regulation continuously run into the twin problems of discretion 
and (in)visibility, but most are premised on instrumental understandings of human motivation 
that, evidence suggests, are not particularly well-suited to explaining the ways people actually 
behave in social settings. 
 
Third, intrinsic modes of regulation can be encouraged or enhanced. Our central theme in this 
chapter is the idea that the legitimacy that police command and require, both externally and 
internally, may be pivotal to this process. On the one hand, police at the organizational level are 
engaged in a continuous process of establishing and reproducing their legitimacy among those 
they police; this means that they must – to some extent – be responsive to, and in tune with, the 
communities they serve. Police cannot, in other words, simply do what they want. Legitimacy is 
founded in public perceptions of fairness, probity, honesty and lawfulness (although the 
situation in some developing countries may provide an interesting counterpoint, where 
effectiveness may be relatively or absolutely more important – Karakus, 2015; Jackson et al. 
2014; Bradford et al. 2013; Tankebe 2009; although see Akinlabi, 2015; and Kochel et al., 2013) 
and the need for legitimacy acts as an empirical constraint on police power. If police wish to 
reproduce their legitimacy they are channelled toward behaving within certain limits; actions 
outside established normative frameworks will undermine legitimacy, and these limitations are 
likely to correlate closely with established ethical values – particularly in relation to notions of 
fairness. 
 
On the other hand, legitimacy within police organizations can motivate officers to behave in 
certain ways. The argument here is that: 
 
a) Organizational justice encourages identification with the organization 
b) Identification with the organization leads to legitimation of its practices and processes and 
internalization of its values and goals 
c) Legitimation and internalization motivates compliance with organizational rules and values. 
d) This process encourage officers to see themselves as legitimate, strengthening self-
confidence and opening up the possibility for positive policing styles.  
 
Police organizations that have the right goals, that communicate these goals to staff, and that 
treat staff in a organizationally fair ways may be able to motivate internal processes of 
legitimacy that are themselves constitutive of a check on police power, or at least will tend to 
channel it in desirable directions. 
 
It seems to us that – in the absence of fundamental change to the role of police in liberal 
democracies (which is not quite as far-fetched as it might seem if contractual, private-sector 
type arrangements gain even greater traction than is currently the case) – and given the 
intractable problems associated with the application of extrinsic constraints on officer 
behaviour, questions of legitimacy should take centre-stage in efforts to exert constraints on 
police discretionary power and encourage ethical policing. In particular, the internal notion of 
legitimacy seems to offer significant possibilities, not least because it can bypass currents in 
public opinion inimical to limits on police power (at least when this is directed at denigrated 
out-groups and ‘others’), yet is at the same time amenable to external influence from, for 
example, democratically elected oversight bodies. Which is to say, in addition, that legitimacy 
backed up by extrinsic modes of regulation (and greater visibility) is likely to a particularly 
effective strategy. However, as we describe below this is not an entirely one-way street, and it is 
entirely possible that legitimacy also opens up the space for unethical behaviours. 
 
In the following pages we consider the three strategies outlined above in the context of 
regulating stop and search/frisk and similar policing tactics. This is an example of the sort of 
police activities that raise questions about individual rights, of structural racism, procedural and 
distributive justice, and the limits of police power and legitimacy (and which many believe need 
to change), and to set the scene we first introduce the issue of stop and search/frisk. We focus 
primarily on the UK given the context in which we both work – but much of what follows will be 
relevant in other Anglophone contexts as well, perhaps, as more widely still. 
 
Stop and search/frisk 
The power to stop, question, temporarily detain, and search people ‘on the streets’ is one of the 
most controversial powers vested in the police in the UK, the US, and increasingly elsewhere 
(e.g. Open Society Justice Initiative 2009). Legally speaking, this police power is often relatively 
constrained, albeit wide-ranging. In most circumstances police cannot simply decide to 
‘randomly’ stop and/or search people. But there are important exceptions in some contexts. In 
England and Wales, for instance, various forms of the power are enshrined in law, the most 
important of which is Section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, otherwise known 
as PACE. PACE applies a reasonable suspicion test, meaning police must have a justifiable 
reason for stopping someone with a view to searching them. But other pieces of legislation do 
not, notably s60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, which allows officers to 
search a person without suspicion. Searches under these powers, although they occur in public 
spaces, can be relatively invasive; and individuals stopped are required by police to stay for the 
duration of, and acquiesce to, any search that follows, and officers can use force to ensure they 
do so. 
 
Despite the existence of legal constraints, the conduct of street stops is a classically low 
visibility, high discretion, police activity. Street-level officers get to decide whom to stop, when 
and where, with very little possibility of external oversight (of individual stops – the overall 
number of stops is a potential target for external regulation, and police can be, and often are, 
encouraged to increase/decrease the number of stops they conduct). The importance of 
discretion here is magnified by the fact that police have a range of what might be termed sub-
legal powers to ‘stop’ people and question them in the street. In some countries, such as 
Scotland, it is known that the use of ‘consent’ searches is widespread, since many are recorded 
by police (Murray 2014). Elsewhere the use of ‘consent’ as an enabler of police activity is 
assumed to be widespread but its extent remains largely hidden (Dixon 2008). Sub-legal tools 
available to police to garner consent for a stop range from the inherent authority police 
command in relation to significant numbers of people – to whom a simple question from a 
police officer may be experienced as requiring a response – to the ability of police to draw other 
informal sources of power and influence to direct behaviour. Moreover, in continental Europe 
and elsewhere the ability of and often requirement that police conduct ID checks offers a further 
range of opportunities for police to interdict and question people. 
 
In a general sense, a power to stop, question and search people that is short of a full arrest is 
useful for both police and the policed (in the latter case mainly because of the well-known 
negative implications arising from being arrested – it is often argued that if police did not have 
the power to stop and search they would turn to the more invasive power of arrest as a means 
to achieving the same ends). Yet, public encounters with the police provide moments in which 
the legitimacy of the police is asserted, tested, and all too often undermined (Tyler & Fagan, 
2008; Jackson et al., 2012a; Mazerolle et al., 2013; Geller et al., 2014; Tyler et al., 2014; Slocum 
et al., 2015). Whether governed by statute or based on the sociological power of police to 
intervene in people’s lives, stop and search/frisk encounters can take place in almost any of the 
contexts within which police and public interact. Officers conducting a stop are, implicitly or 
explicitly, making a claim as to the rightfulness of the authority vested in them. As a key part of 
the police ‘voice’ in the legitimacy ‘dialogue’ envisioned by Bottoms and Tankebe (2012), every 
stop and search encounter involves a claim that police are empowered to treat citizens in this 
way; that the nature and extent of this power is defensible; and that the ability of police to wield 
coercive force to ensure compliance is itself justified. The people stopped make judgements 
about these claims, asking whether the actions of the police were justified in this and similar 
cases; whether the officer acted proportionately and with the right intentions, or whether he or 
she motivated by bias or prejudice; whether the laws on which this method of policing is based 
themselves justified, in terms of the aims they embody and the fairness with which they are 
applied; and whether it is right that this officer can forcibly detain one if one resists. 
 
Stop and search remains a highly charged, contested and in many ways deeply problematic 
aspect of police practice. The proximate reason for this is ethnic and other disproportionalities 
in the experience of police stop and search activity. Stop and search has been a controversial 
issue for many years, in part because it is a mode of police practice that seems consistently to be 
unevenly applied: socially, geographically and, particularly, ethnically (Smith and Gray 1985; 
Keith 1993; Bowling and Philips 2002; Medina Ariza 2014; Bradford and Loader 2016). People 
from some ethnic minority groups are more likely to experience this form of police contact than 
their majority-group counterparts, a phenomena which has, we should note, been identified 
well beyond the UK (see Weber and Bowling 2012). Black people living in England and Wales 
are stopped at a rate around 6 times that which their proportion in the general population 
would suggest is appropriate, for example (Shiner and Delsol 2015). This is a practice intimately 
caught up in the debate around institutional and other forms of racism within the police service, 
and with wider currents of ethnic and racial exclusion and oppression. 
 
Despite the underlying desirability of granting to police an investigatory tool that stops short of 
arrest, then, the wide-ranging power vested in police to initiate stop and search encounters 
poses problems for both parties involved. Police lose legitimacy when its use of power seems 
misdirected; the policed are dragged at least to the threshold of the criminal justice system; all 
lose when trust in the police is undermined. And these questions are made all the more pressing 
by the weight of evidence that the power stop and search/frisk can be, and is, misused and 
sometimes abused. There is the issue of ethnic disproportionality: racial profiling, and equally 
implicit bias and stereotyping, violate foundational principles of equality and citizenship, and 
such behaviours on the part of police serve as part of what Epp et al. (2014: 5) call a ‘broad, 
continuing pattern in which racial minorities are disproportionately subjected to suspicious 
inquiries without any particular basis or justification.’ Other disproportionalities have also been 
identified – by gender, age, social class and across other markers of exclusion (Bradford and 
Loader 2016) – and the typically low proportion of stop/searches that result in arrests is also an 
issue. The London Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), for example, has recently improved its ‘hit 
rate’ (the proportion of stops resulting in an arrest) to around 20 per cent, from previous rates 
as low as 9 per cent. But this means that something like four out of five searches in London do 
not result in an arrest (although a further proportion do lead to some other criminal justice 
outcome, such as a drugs warning). There is a constant concern that this implies a misuse of 
invasive police power. 
 
In sum, stop and search is a police power both necessary and in need of ethical constraint. While 
it is generally desirable that police have available to them investigatory powers that fall short of 
arrest it is important that their use of these powers is restrained, appropriate and 
proportionate. Yet, evidence from a wide variety of contexts frequently suggests a lack of 
restraint, inappropriate application, and disproportionate outcomes. 
 
Finding the balance: Enabling and constraining discretionary power 
All this raises a number of important questions about the legitimacy of the power and the wider 
set of police practices it represents (proactive, police-led, coercive criminal justice 
interventions, see Tyler et al., 2015; Bowling and Philips 2007; Delsol and Shiner 2006; Jackson 
et al. 2012b; Miller & D’Souza, 2015). How can the practice be effectively regulated such that it 
is wielded in a more ethically sustainable manner? What mechanisms can be put in place to 
encourage (if not, in the final analysis, to ensure) restraint, appropriateness and 
proportionality?  
 
In the rest of the chapter we consider some of the ways in which constraint might be provided 
for, while at the same time recognizing that the existence of constraints on police activity also, 
perhaps paradoxically, enable the use of power – including in an unethical manner. In what 
follows we are interested in the regulation of police activity in its widest sense, as well as stop 
and search in particular, where much of this activity – including ‘police stops’ – occurs in 
settings either not governed by explicit law or, at least, where the police are given very 
significant discretion in how to apply the law. By regulation, we refer to setting the goal of an 
activity, monitoring it, and realigning it if it is found to be being misapplied or misdirected 
(Sanders 2008: 51) – of these, monitoring and realignment figure most prominently in the 
discussion – but, equally, we are concerned with the question of how to promote and maintain 
ethical standards within police organizations in a wider sense. By what mechanisms can police 
officers be encouraged to ‘do the right thing’? 
 
Limiting police discretion through changing the law 
Most stops occur as and when officers, individually or in small groups, decide on whom to stop 
and for what reason – of course, the decision on whom not to stop is equally discretionary – 
albeit that such practice can also be directed by organizational policies and priority setting. 
Indeed, the extent of discretion available to police in this area seems likely to be one of the key 
factors driving ethnic and other disproportionalities in stop and search/frisk activity, not least 
because discretion – the ability to make decisions – enables and even motivates biased and 
stereotyped decision-making. Officers are often making differentiating or categorizing decisions 
at very short notice in low-information settings – it would hardly be surprising if they based 
these decisions on stereotypes, or were subject to implicit biases when doing so (Glaser 2015; 
Legewie, 2016). 
 
On the face of it, one way to realign police activity in this and related areas would be to place 
legal limits on officer discretion. It might seem, at first glance, relatively easy to come up with a 
list of circumstances within which stop and search could and could not be used. But such a task 
would likely fail, for the simple reason that, as noted by Bittner (1974: 35, quoted in Reiner 
2010: 144), the job of the police is to produce contingent solutions “to an unknown problem, 
arrived at by unknown means”. The task of policing is so diffuse and wide-ranging that is 
impossible to come up with an a priori list of possible problems, the corollary being that 
potential solutions might be applied in an almost limitless set of circumstances. Discretion on 
what solution to use and when to use it is fundamental to the practice of police, and to limit it 
would not only fundamentally alter the nature of policing but would also make it less effective. 
As an important tool of policing, not least because it is less invasive than arrest, stop and search 
provides a potential ‘solution’ to an extremely large number of ‘problems’, and the ethics of its 
use – whether or not it is the right thing to do – will vary on an almost case-by-case basis. 
 
Police discretion is also vital for another reason: it is impossible to enforce all laws, all of the 
time; or even for a fraction of the time (Goldstein 1963). Police are constantly engaged in the 
process of deciding when, where and on whom the law should be applied, and for all that this is 
a highly imperfect process (the law is misapplied, the ‘wrong’ people are targeted) it is also 
inevitable. As Goldstein pointed out, it is, first, simply not feasible to enforce all laws or sanction 
their transgression in every case, not least because resources are limited. Second, police have 
other aims, such as ‘keeping the peace’ and assisting people in need, which can and do conflict 
with any requirement to enforce the law. To return to the example at hand, it might be argued 
that police should be required to stop and search an individual when, for example, they have a 
strong suspicion of drug use, and that this requirement might be offset by raising the 
‘reasonable suspicion’ bar in some way, such that discretion is limited at the top and the bottom 
of the scale. But to impinge on discretion in this way would create more problems than it solved, 
as when, for example, a ‘required’ search might increase the risk of public disorder. Police 
officers are constantly engaged in balancing these types of competing demands. 
 
We do not, then, focus on legal solutions in this chapter. This is not because we believe that the 
law has no place in regulating the power of the police, but rather because we take seriously the 
findings of 50 years of police research that has found legal regulation to be only one factor 
among many influencing police activity and, many would claim, a relatively minor one at that 
(Bittner 1990; Ericson 1982; Reiner 2010). We ask, instead, how and by whom can stop and 
search be effectively scrutinized, and how can change be effected, if its use is found to be out of 
kilter with norms of probity and justice? We discuss three possible ways that stop and search 
practice – and by extension other police activity – might brought into and maintained within a 
set of ethical standards or constraints: (a) increasing visibility; (b) extrinsic motivation of 
individuals and organizations; and (c) legitimacy and procedural justice inside and outside the 
police. These three headings are intended as heuristic rather than determinative categories, not 
least because there will plainly be significant overlap and interaction between them. They do, 
however, provide for a relatively wide-ranging set of possibilities. It is important to reiterate 
that legal proscription will have a part to play here, but it will inevitably be just one element of a 
wider process that, we might further suggest, will often exert pressure on police via one or more 
of the pathways we explore below. 
 
Increasing visibility 
There is little doubt that policing is becoming more and more visible, in the sense that 
technological advances such as mobile phone cameras and internet connections mean that 
police activity that was previously visible only to those ‘at the scene’ can now be recorded, 
uploaded and viewed on-line more or less in real time (Goldsmith 2010). Social media ensure 
that the existence of any such recordings can be rapidly propagated, and there is an ever-
increasing blurring of the lines between ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ media that can trigger significant 
repercussions from particular events, as witnessed most dramatically in the furore surrounding 
many recent police shootings in the United States. Sanders’ (2008) call for ‘anchored pluralism’ 
in the regulation of police resonates with the idea that multiple actors can and should be 
involved in the monitoring of police via enhanced visibility. Whether policing is made visible by 
change within the service, via body worn video or similar technology, or outside the service via 
citizen ‘sousveillance’ (Mann et al. 2003) of the police, this process may provide for more 
effective monitoring of police and constitute a lever through which to exert pressure for change. 
 
Considering the full effect of these developments on police behaviour is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. In a general sense, though, we concur with the argument the advent of new 
communication technologies means it is “highly probable that the new capacities for 
surveillance of policing inherent in these technologies may increase the police’s accountability 
to the public, while decreasing their account ability” – that is, their ability to provide definitive 
accounts of events that cannot effectively be challenged by other participants (Goldsmith 2010: 
915). It is hard to imagine that such developments will not, to some extent at least, curtail and 
channel the power of police in new and in all likelihood more ethically desirable (less 
aggressive, more conciliatory) directions. As proponents of deterrence theory have long 
emphasized (Ariel et al 2015: 516), even the suggestion of being watched can influence 
behaviour, for example if the revelation of non-compliance risks reputational damage or 
punishment. Yet new communication technologies do not offer a panacea, as the recent (at the 
time of writing in November 2015) string of recordings of aggressive, violent and lethal police 
actions in various parts of the United States attests. Being recorded on someone’s mobile phone 
does not always deter police malpractice. Moreover, police often retain the ability to shape 
perceptions (most pertinently, in court) of what was reasonable or unreasonable to do in a 
given situation regardless of whether it happened to be caught on video or not (Brucato 2015). 
 
One specific example of technological change is worthy of a little more consideration, however, 
precisely because it often is presented as a panacea (Ariel et al. 2015: 510) that will resolve 
deep-seated issues in the relationship between police and publics – body worn video cameras 
(hereafter, BWV). These devices are increasingly being taken up by police organizations in the 
United States, United Kingdom and elsewhere (Jennings et al 2014), and they have been 
welcomed by police and activist groups alike as a tool that will increase visibility and 
transparency, and thus enhance accountability (Brucato 2015) via a new system of monitoring 
mechanisms that was simply unavailable a decade ago. In terms of our example in this chapter, 
one claim would be that stop/searches recorded by the police are less likely to escalate – since 
both parties are aware they are being recorded and adapt their behaviours to bring them in line 
established behavioural norms in relation to, for example, fair process (Ariel et al. 2015) – and if 
encounters do become more problematic as a result of the behaviour of either party, a record of 
what transpired will exist to aid any subsequent investigation.  
 
Again, this idea has face validity and seems likely to have some explanatory power. It would 
seem perverse to argue that the greater visibility provided by BWV will have no positive 
implications whatsoever. However as Brucato (2015) and others (e.g. Ledderman 2014) have 
argued there is significant danger in over-emphasizing their potential benefits. First and most 
obviously, the people wearing the cameras choose when to turn them on and off. The decision 
on what to record and for how long will rest with individual officers, and while guidelines or 
more formal rules will obviously play some role (Kitzmueller 2014) the discretion vested in 
those officers will still grant them significant control over what gets recorded. Yet this is just 
one example of what Brucato (2015) argues is a much wider problem – the use of mobile 
recording technology does not obviate, and may even strengthen, the symbolic and actual 
power of police to ‘frame’ what is recorded, both literally (events recorded on BWV are by 
definition shown from the officer’s perspective) and figuratively. Despite increased challenges 
to their authority over recent years police remain ‘legitimate namers’ (Loader and Mulcahy 
2001), with a significant ability to define events and shape their resolution. To reiterate the 
point made above, this means that recordings from BWV are likely to be viewed from a police 
perspective and in a way that favours police interpretations of what transpired. 
 
In sum, while BWV and other ways of recording police activity are indeed likely to have made it 
more transparent and accountable, and possibly also more compliant with established norms of 
probity and fairness. However they do not constitute a magic wand, since they neither 
undermine the fundamental power of police to define events nor shift officer motivations much 
beyond reaction to a greater risk of being called out for inappropriate, undesirable or illegal 
behaviour. This last point is central. Almost all discussion of the influence of BWV and other 
recording technology on police officers has revolved around rational choice and deterrence 
theory – the presence of cameras deters them from behaviours they might otherwise have 
engaged in simply because the cameras increase the risk of censure and sanction. The emphasis 
is, then, on extrinsic motivations for behaviour that, we argue below, are not necessarily 
particularly strong or efficacious. On this basis alone increased surveillance of police is unlikely 
to solve on its own the problems thrown up by stop and search (and many other practices 
besides). 
 
Extrinsic motivation of individuals and organizations 
Extrinsic motivations relate in essence to enticements and punishments. Rational choice (risk 
and reward) models of human behaviour appear as dominant in the human resource 
departments of police organizations as they are in may other public- and private-sector 
organizations (Kohn, 1999; Tyler, 2011). Rewards (such as performance-related pay) and 
punishments (such as fixed limits on sickness absence) are frequently used to motivate staff. 
The core idea is that individual officers can be motivated to modulate or realign their behaviour 
by external pressures. First, they will comply with rules, or conform to priorities when they 
believe they will be punished in some way if they do not. Stop and search might be encouraged 
or discouraged, for example, by threatening front-line officers with sanction if they conduct too 
many, or not enough. Second, they will respond to the promise of reward, and comply and 
cooperate when they feel they will gain from doing so. Organizations can of course be influenced 
in cognate ways – by the threat of disapproval, opprobrium or sanction from external actors 
who are symbolically, economically or legally relevant, or by the promise of financial or other 
rewards from the same sources.  
 
Tyler (2011: 27) contrasts such extrinsic motivations with intrinsic motivations that stem from 
personal values and moral beliefs (see below), and the efficacy of extrinsic motivations in 
relation to individuals is contested, albeit that their potential relevance in a hierarchical and 
quasi-military organization such as the police cannot be doubted. Police officers do act, and do 
refrain from acting, because they fear the threat of sanction or punishment. Perhaps more 
importantly, though, it seems almost certain that police organizations are open to influence via, 
in particular, the threat of sanction or disapproval from legally or politically relevant actors – 
particularly those with control legislation and/or budgets. 
 
An example of just such a process has been observed in London in recent years precisely in the 
arena of stop and search. Following a peak in the numbers of stop and searches around 
2011/12, and a corresponding upsurge in the level of dispute around the practice – some of 
which was shaped by the aftermath of London riots in 2011 – the Home Secretary Theresa May 
made a number of highly critical comments about the Metropolitan Police’s (MPS) use of the 
power, which she repeated on numerous occasions over the next few years. In April 2014, for 
example, she said in Parliament that “if the numbers do not come down, if stop and search does 
not become more targeted, if those stop-to-arrest ratios do not improve considerably, the 
government will return with primary legislation to make those things happen” (Guardian 2014). 
In the face of threats of an enforced change to its practice – and perhaps equally importantly to 
stigma associated with such a threat – it appears the MPS made significant changes in relation to 
the use of stop and search; or, at least, it encouraged its officers to do so. Over 468,000 stop and 
searches under PACE section 1 and associated powers were conducted in London in 2011/12;1 
by the calendar year 2014 this had fallen to less than 200,000.2 As noted above, arrest rates 
increased over the same period. It is important to note here that the use of power was not 
changed by legislation, but, apparently, by the mere threat of legislation, and the political 
pressure exerted by police not only by the Home Secretary but by activist groups as well (e.g. 
Release 2014). 
 
Despite such apparent successes, however, it is unlikely that extrinsic motivations in relation to 
either officers or organization will be enough on their own to maintain an appropriate level of 
constraint on police power – or of ethical practice – in this or any other area. Notably, there was 
a previous reduction in the use of stop and search, and ethnic disproportionality, in England and 
Wales around the time of the Stephen Lawrence enquiry in 1999, and it is generally 
hypothesized that this reflected at least in part change in police practice in the face of significant 
public and political scrutiny in the wake of the scandal the enquiry uncovered (e.g. Shiner and 
Delsol 2015). However, as the political agenda changed and shifted focus in the early years of 
the new millennium the use of stop and search, and ethnic disproportionality, increased 
significantly. By the middle of the decade both had surpassed previous levels. 
 
Extrinsic motivations are by nature short-lived and even transitory. Individuals shift back to 
previous behavior patterns once threats and rewards lose salience. This is a key criticism of, for 
example, performance related pay (Frey and Osterloh 2012; Perry et al. 2009) – it does not 
motivate long-term change to attitudes and behaviours. It seems organizations are much the 
same. Moreover the overall effect of even fundamental changes to the legal framework around 
stop and search – that might be expected to generate changes in practice by shifting structures 
of risk – is contested. Sanders (2008) claims, for example, that the introduction of PACE actually 
did little to affect street-level police practice, certainly as the ‘shock’ of its introduction receded. 
Of course, we might also note that there has been few if any convictions or other sanctioning of 
officers for breaking the PACE guidelines (c.f. HMIC 2013) and, of course, that many ‘police 
stops’ occur entirely outside the framework it established. 
  
Legitimacy and procedural justice inside and outside the police 
Our third set of possible ways to regulate the power of the police and motivate ethical practice 
revolve around the relationship the police have with the policed, and the ways in which police 
behaviour affects this relationship. In our view, the need for police to retain a certain level of 
legitimacy among the populations they serve provides an important empirical constraint on 
their behaviour and, moreover that processes of legitimation within the police may be critical 
for understanding how police behave in relation to the police. 
 
The most important understanding of the relationship people have with police and other legal 
authorities is currently provided by work conducted under the banner of procedural justice 
theory. Developed by Tom Tyler and colleagues in the US (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler 2006a, 
2006b; Tyler and Blader 2000; Tyler and Huo 2002) and increasingly applied in contexts across 
the world (e.g. Hinds and Murphy 2007; Tankebe 2009; Hasisi & Weisburd, 2011; Huq et al., 
2011; Murphy & Cherney, 2012; Factor et al., 2013; Mazerolle et al., 2013; Jackson et al., 2014; 
Bradford et al., 2014; Slocum et al., 2015; Pennington, 2015; Cheng, 2015; Saarikkomäki, 2015; 
Akinlabi, 2015; Van Damme, 2015; Wolfe et al., 2015; Cavanagh & Cauffrana, 2015; Mclean & 
Wolfe, 2015; Reisig & Bain, 2015; Bieijersbergen et al., 2015; Murphy et al., 2016), procedural 
justice theory stresses the social connection between criminal justice agencies and the 
populations they serve. Studies of the general population have found that people regard the 
police as legitimate when and if they believe officers exercise their authority through fair and 
impartial means – that is, when they behave in a procedurally just manner (Sunshine & Tyler, 
2003a; Tyler and Huo 2002; Jackson et al, 2013).  
 
There is also some evidence of procedural justice effects among what might be termed ‘offender 
populations’ (Paternoster et al. 1997; Papachristos et al., 2012; Barrajon et al., 2015; Murphy et 
al. 2016) and in relation to other criminal justice agencies, for example prisons, which unlike the 
police deal primarily with such populations (Sparks et al. 1995; Robinson and McNeil 2008; 
Liebling 2004; Brunton-Smith & McCarthy, 2015). It seems that the associations between 
experiences of policing, trust and legitimacy described above are found among social groups or 
categories of individual who might be expect to be alienated from the police and thus 
uninterested in the expressive aspects of police behaviour, although this is not of course to 
claim that procedural justice effects are in any sense universal. 
 
Procedural justice is marked and demonstrated by transparency, fair, equitable and respectful 
treatment, following correct procedure and not exhibiting bias, and a feeling of control over the 
processes through which people interact with authorities. People place particular value on voice 
(Hirschman 1970) during interactions, neutrality on the part of the authority, treatment with 
respect and dignity, and a sense of trust, meaning that the term ‘procedural justice’ refers to 
neither process in a technical sense – for example in terms of court process or police protocol – 
nor to justice in a normative or philosophical sense. Rather, what is at stake is individuals’ 
subjective judgements about the quality of interpersonal interaction with police officers and the 
openness of police decision-making processes that affect them. Treatment that is experienced as 
fair, decent and respectful encourages people to trust the police; a general perception that 
police behave in a fair way promotes a similar sense of trust. Despite the lack of formal 
correspondence between ‘procedural justice’ and more legally informed notions of ‘fair process’ 
it is an interesting feature of work on procedural justice that there is a strong correspondence 
between lay understandings of the way criminal justice agencies should behave and 
institutional and legal structures intended to govern their behaviour – what in the US might be 
termed ‘due process’ and a respect for individual’s rights, for example – which are themselves 
oriented toward objective criteria of justice and probity.3  
 
Importantly, research has failed to find consistent links between perceptions of the 
instrumental effectiveness of police and legitimacy (ironically, perhaps, if police officers believe 
that their legitimacy is earnt by effectiveness not procedural justice, see Nix, 2015). While in 
some contexts, such as developing countries (Bradford et al. 2014; Tankebe 2009), it may be 
that efficacy and efficiency are strongly linked to legitimacy, studies conducted in developed 
countries regularly find only weak associations between measures of police effectiveness (for 
example in dealing with crimes or maintaining order) and measures of legitimacy (for an 
overview of the European context see Hough et al. 2013). Just as it seems that deterrence – the 
demonstration of effectiveness – has relatively little direct influence on offending (although it 
can have some), effectiveness has relatively little direct association with legitimacy (although, 
again, it can have some). 
 
The work of legitimacy 
Police rely on the legitimacy they command to operate effectively (Tyler, 2003, 2004). If 
procedural justice theory is correct that legitimacy is founded most importantly in the use of fair 
process, then the constant need to establish and reproduce legitimacy may serve as an 
important check on police power (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2006a, 2006b; Hough et al., 
2013). While such power may, in a conceptual sense, be ‘unlimited’ – since the police are the 
arm of that the State charged with confronting all possible internal threats to its integrity and 
effective functioning (see Dubber, 2005) – it is limited in an empirical sense by the need for 
police to ensure they do not behave in ways that consistently challenge their legitimacy and 
which might, in the long run, undermine or even remove it. Should this occur, the very existence 
of the organization would be called into question – the ultimate extrinsic motivation, perhaps. 
What this means is that police cannot simply ‘do what they want’, despite the extent of the 
power vested in them, and this is for reasons less to do with the law (although the law will of 
course be relevant in some circumstances) and more to do with the fact that every interaction 
they have with citizens is a moment in which legitimacy is tested, proved or undermined (Tyler 
2011). 
 
There are, however, some important provisos to this argument. First, it is obvious that police 
organizations can and do act in ways that run against dominant norms of probity and fairness 
without necessarily undermining their legitimacy in any fundamental sense. There are too many 
examples to count, but one is the continued over-use and even abuse of stop and search/frisk, 
which all available evidence suggests has been used unjustly on many occasions in the UK and 
elsewhere. Not only has the legitimacy of the police not collapsed as a result of this; public 
support for the use of stop and search remains, in a general sense, high.  
 
Second, and relatedly, police behavior that runs counter to norms of procedural justice can be, 
and is, tolerated by some individuals and groups if it is directed at denigrated or excluded out-
groups. Indeed, since procedural justice is not the only factor shaping legitimacy, there may be 
significant numbers of people who might in fact respond positively to police ‘cracking down’ on 
out-groups and grant legitimacy on that basis, at least to some degree (c.f. Harkin 2014). 
 
Third, it is likely that legitimacy can create the possibility for acting beyond established norms, 
or against community wishes, since it creates a reservoir of goodwill on which police can draw 
and against which they may discount specific transgressions; a notion akin to Easton’s (1965) 
concept of diffuse support. There are historical resonances here, in that police abuses in the past 
were almost certainly facilitated by the unquestioning adherence of large sections of the 
population to the legitimacy of the police (see for example Royal Commission on the Police 
1962): high levels of legitimacy created the space in which police malpractice could flourish. 
However, as the history of policing in a country such as the UK shows, this reservoir can be 
drained, not least by reports of police misbehavior and corruption (Bradford 2011).  
 
Fourth, the external notion of legitimacy positions the organizational need for legitimacy as a 
kind of ‘natural’ constraint on police power because this legitimacy rests on citizens’ 
experiences of the fairness of police activity. However, to the extent that the police do not rely 
on the policed for legitimacy (i.e. where it is granted directly by the state or by some other 
authority), the need to reproduce legitimacy will provide much less of a constraint on behavior 
because it is less reliant on the quality of the police relationship with the policed.  
        
Encouraging legitimate policing   
Provisos aside, it can be argued that the need to establish and reproduce legitimacy serves, at 
least in a country such as the UK, as an important check on police power. Because abiding by 
established norms of fairness is such an important factor shaping legitimacy, police have a 
strong motivation to engage in ethically desirable practice; yet this raises an important 
question. How can officers be encouraged to behave in ways that produce and reproduce 
legitimacy? It is highly unlikely that such behavior will simply arise organically, not least 
because of the well-known disconnect between the ‘police culture’ emphasis on crime-fighting 
and thief-taking and the prioritization of procedural justice among large sections of the 
population (Jonathan-Zamir et al. 2014). It seems that for many police, the way to generate 
legitimacy is to demonstrate firm effectiveness not treat people with procedural fairness.  
Equally, the pressures and conflicting priorities under which most police operate might seem 
inimical to the development of relationships with the policed based on fairness and shared 
interests – to police, that is, procedural justice often seems nice to do but not essential (Foster et 
al 2010). And if legitimacy as a motivating factor remains extrinsic, tied to external forces to 
which police merely respond, then as argued above it is likely to provide only a weak check on 
practice in the long run. An upswing in public concerns about fairness might affect police 
practice in the short term, but once the spotlight of media and/or political attention turns 
elsewhere things are likely to return to the status quo ante. 
 
There is, however, an emerging body of evidence that police activity – the actions of individual 
police officers and the values that underpin them – can be influenced by procedural justice 
within the organization. Just as members of the public value fairness, openness, honesty and 
respect in their interactions with police, so officers value these same features of their 
relationships with their superiors (Bradford et al. 2013; Bradford and Quinton 2014; Haas et al. 
2015; Myhill and Bradford 2013; Schafer 2013; Tankebe 2011; Wolfe and Piquero 2011). 
Research has shown that ‘organizational justice’, a term generally assigned a meaning very close 
to that of procedural justice (Colquitt et al. 2001; Colquitt et al. 2008), can enhance positive 
forms identification with the police organization, promotes commitment to organization goals 
and norms, and is associated both with positive views about procedurally just and community 
based modes of policing and lower levels of misconduct.  
 
While little research thus far has directly addressed the issues at hand, it seems that one 
possible way to regulate the power of the police is to ensure that those wielding this power – 
street-level officers – are treated in as organizationally just manner as possible by their 
managers and superiors. Particularly striking is research that suggests fairness within police 
organizations is associated with greater ‘buy-in’ to organizational goals (Bradford et al. 2013; 
Bradford and Quinton 2014; Myhill and Bradford 2013; Tankebe 2011), and a diminished 
adherence to problematic beliefs and behaviours (Wolfe and Piquero 2011). On these accounts, 
if police organizations set the correct goals – for example in relation to the appropriate use of 
powers such as stop and search – and communicate these to staff effectively, then compliance 
with them will be promoted by use of fair processes within the organization. At one level, this 
appears as a version of social exchange theory – the ‘reward’ of fair treatment (as a form of 
emotional resource) is linked in a reciprocal relationship with behaviours that actors believe 
will stimulate the reward in the future. Much work on organizational justice, however, shares 
with procedural justice theory (e.g. Bradford et al. 2014) the idea that fairness at the hands of 
group authorities – in this case superiors within a work setting – promotes identification with 
the organization as a social group and, over time, internalization of its aims and values (Tyler 
and Blader 2000, 2003).  
 
Organizational justice - and the positive identification with the police organization that it 
engenders - has also been directly linked to processes of internal legitimacy development 
(Bottoms and Tankebe 2012; Bradford and Quinton 2014). Processes of legitimation are 
intimately linked with processes of identification (Barker 1991) and those with power and 
authority in a particular context are constantly engaged in generating a narrative that both 
justifies their power – turning it into authority in their own minds – and elides the difference 
between the self and the role. ‘Self-legitimacy’, in these terms, is an important motivator of 
behaviour, enabling actions by providing them with direction and meaning. Behaviour that fits a 
self-legitimating narrative reinforces the feeling of justified authority those with power require 
if they are to maintain an appropriate image of themselves and confidence in their own 
authority. This narrative also helps constitute a set of claims to legitimacy, and is a key part of 
the legitimacy dialogue envisaged by Bottoms and Tankebe (2012). 
 
Bradford and Quinton (2014) found that identification with the police organization was very 
strongly correlated with officer’s confidence in their own authority (their sense that their use of 
power was justified), and that both identification and self-legitimacy predicted attitudes toward 
policing means, such as the appropriate use of force, and ends, such as protecting suspect’s 
rights. Working with a sample of police officers from an English constabulary, they argued that 
identification with the police force promoted ‘buy-in’ to its values, and promoting or acting on 
these values became an important part of the officer’s construction of self and understanding of 
themselves as figures of authority in society. 
 
There is a possibility, therefore, that there is a virtuous circle that links organizational justice 
within the police organization, through officer’s identification as police, to their sense that their 
power and authority is justified. Identification and legitimation motivate attitudes and 
behaviours that ‘fit’ with the narrative of justified authority of which they are part. The obvious 
problem is that identification and legitimation within police organizations might, absent a 
clearly expressed and honestly held set of ethical goals and criteria for success, encourage 
officers to behave in ways different to those outlined above. That is, the narrative of policing has 
to be based on a more or less clearly expressed set of ends and means, and these have to be the 
right ends and means in a ethical sense for the above process to be considered ‘virtuous’. Police 
organizations need to communicate clearly to staff how they are expected to behave, and why, if 
organizational justice is to lead to or promote ethical behaviour ‘on the streets’. Because officers 
internalize the values the organization expresses to them as part of the process of identification 
and legitimation, it follows that if these are the wrong values then behaviours that reinforce the 
narrative of self-legitimacy might look rather different. 
 
Stop and search again provides a useful example of this latter kind of process. As suggested 
above police organizations all too often over-stress, to both internal and external audiences, the 
need for and desirability of instrumental effectiveness in relation to crime over other aspects of 
police-work, such as its more service- and even social service-related aspects (Punch 1979). 
Based in some of the classic elements of ‘police culture’, such as the thin blue line ideology and 
the emphasis on ‘thief-taking’ (Reiner 2010), and also the continued dominance of deterrence-
based thinking in police policy and political discourse, this emphasis communicates to officers 
that what is really important is ‘getting results’. This in turn becomes a value and an aim, 
working towards which is integrated into their identity as police officers and their sense of their 
own legitimacy. Stop and search practice – more or less pro-active policing aimed at solving or 
preventing crimes and asserting order on the streets – may then be an important element in 
both officer’s self-legitimacy and the legitimation claims they make to others. Despite the 
problematic history of stop and search, this is a power that can nevertheless represent the 
activity of policing in important ways, its chance for success and the place of police in wider 
society. Stop and search may serve as a mechanism through which legitimacy is claimed; the 
need to make such claims, and the types of benefits they might bring for police if successful, may 
provide one set of reasons for its continued use.  
 
It is also undoubtedly the case that there is significant support for stop and search – and pro-
active and even aggressive policing styles more generally – among the general public, certainly 
in a general sense and, on occasion, in specific instances (Fitzgerald et al. 2002). Pro-active, and 
sometimes aggressive, policing is popular among a significant proportion of the population 
(Girling et al. 2000), at least as long as it is not aimed at them (ibid.), and it is not entirely 
unreasonable for police managers to respond to such preferences by encouraging officers to use 
stop and search. In other words, as well as pressure from within the service that can be both 
cultural and managerial, there are external factors that may encourage police to believe 
increased, or at least continued, use of stop and search is not only acceptable but desirable and 
supported by the communities they serve. Responding to community priorities is central to 
legitimation processes, at least in as much as these embedded in discursive or dialogical forms 
of legitimacy, and we should not imagine that such community priorities revolve only around 
procedural justice. Most obviously, significant numbers of people in many social settings will as 
noted wish police to target and control ‘difficult’, ‘recalcitrant’ or simply different population 
groups, and the extent to which they grant police legitimacy will be based, in part, on the 
perceived success or failure of such efforts. 
 
The key to ethical practice in this area would thus seem to be promotion of organizational 
structures and processes that encourage appeals to notions of fairness, dignity and respect that 
cross the boundaries of the police organization (i.e. that are important both within it and in its 
relationship with external actors) while at the same time minimizing the valence of more 
atavistic strands of public opinion. Stop and search stands for a much wider set of police 
powers, practices and policies situated in the nexus formed by these competing forces. Indeed 
providing at least a provisional reconciliation of these forces – charting a course between the 
need to be responsive to the desires and wishes of the policed and the need to resist some of 
those desires – is, arguably, a key task of the police: albeit one which it often fails to live up to. 
 
Some closing words 
Our discussion in this chapter has emphasized the need for those at the top of police 
organizations to promote ethical policing practice that will, in as much as it based on fair 
process, serve to bolster legitimacy. Equally, the reconfiguration of internal structures along the 
lines of organizational justice should motivate individual officers to internalize such values and 
enact them in their day-to-day activity. These processes can and indeed possibly do place ethical 
constraints around the exercise of discretionary police power, and we have considered in this 
chapter the idea that legitimacy inside and outside the police provides a useful source of moral 
regulation – particularly when the need or desire to reproduce legitimacy is operative within a 
context marked by high levels of visibility around policing.  
 
Yet, while the quest to win and maintain legitimacy through fair, neutral and equitable policing 
may be an important constraint on police power, its usefulness relies to a significant degree on 
the extent to which police (a) understand and act on what people ‘really want’ from policing but 
also (b) are operating according to a set of normatively justifiable set of ends and means. The 
empirical legitimacy of the police is not an absolute limit on the exercise of police power; the 
extent to which (the need for) legitimacy constrains police action is conditional on the criteria 
used by the policed to assess the police. In as much as their assessments revolve around 
principles of procedural justice, police power will be constrained and channeled in ethically 
desirable directions. Where other factors become more important, this restraint may be 
attenuated and even removed. One obvious conclusion here is, unsurprisingly, that recourse to 
normative concepts of legitimacy is needed to ‘ground’ this relationship in a set of objective 
criteria against which police can be judged. It will not be enough to claim, or even demonstrate, 
that there is widespread public support for police activity – this activity must also be held up 
against ethical and legal norms that establish its legitimacy in a quite different sense. 
 
Of yet more concern is the possibility that legitimacy also enables malpractice. Our claim that it 
is a useful constraint on police power is empirical rather than normative, and it is easy to 
envisage situations where there is ‘too much’ legitimacy, a state of affairs that would seem likely 
to open up space for, allow, and even encourage normatively undesirable police activity. As 
noted above, there is much to suggest that, historically, a broadly unquestioned legitimacy 
allowed the British police if not necessarily to get away with murder then often something very 
close. Which is to claim that there is a significant, and probably irreconcilable, tension – or even 
paradox – at the heart of our argument. Police need legitimacy to survive, and are thus 
constrained in their use of power by the need to demonstrate procedural and other forms of 
fairness. But legitimacy also enables police to wield their power, provides a reservoir of support 
in the face of individual malpractice, and possibly even mandates problematic modes of policing. 
The interplay between these countervailing factors, and their particular configuration at any 
point in time, is likely to have a significant effect on practices such as stop and search – the ends 
towards which they are directed, how they are conducted, and the ways they are experienced by 
the policed. 
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Notes: 
 
1 http://www.stop-watch.org/your-area/area/metropolitan. 
 
2 MPS Stops and Searches Monitoring Mechanism, January 2015. Available at: 
http://www.met.police.uk/foi/pdfs/priorities_and_how_we_are_doing/borough/mps_stop_sear
ch_mon_report_january2015.pdf. 
  
3 Although we note, of course, that these regulations are often honoured more in the breach 
than in the observance, and that criminal justice agencies often behave in ways that are 
subjectively and objectively unfair. 
 
 
 
